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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to Article VIII, §5 of the Utah Constitu-
tion, Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and (j) (1953 as amend-
ed), and Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an Order entered by the 
Honorable George E. Ballif, Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah, on April 6, 1988, granting 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Plain-
tiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the question of whether Zions had com-
pleted the reissuance of the $10,000 certificate of deposit 
payable to "Garth Youd" before the time Zions acted to 
replace the same $10,000 certificate of deposit with a 
certificate of deposit payable to "Wilford Youd, Leona 
Warner and LaRaine Mackley" pursuant to Wilford Youd's 
instructions, constitute a genuine issue of material fact 
raised by Defendants1 Motion fo*- Summary Judgment so as to 
render the trial court's grant of summary judgment er-
roneous? 
2. Because of his possession and due presentment 
of the $10,000 certificate of deposit, was Plaintiff en-
titled as a matter of law to payment of the $10,000 certi-
ficate pursuant to §70A-3-116 and the terms stated on the 
face of the certificate? 
3. Did W. Youd's "request" to prevent payment to 
Plaintiff fail to comply with §75-6-101 such that court's 
grant of summary judgment was erroneous as a matter of law? 
4. Did a bailment of the $10,000 and $15,000 
certificates of deposit exist such that Zions1 issuance of 
new $10,000 and $15,000 certificate in the names of W. Youd 
and his daughters constitutes conversion? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff, Garth Youd, brings this action to 
recover for Defendants' negligent prosecution of an action 
on behalf of Plaintiff against Zions First National Bank 
("Zions"). The action against Zions was based on Zions1 
improper payment of two certificates of deposit to Plain-
tiff's father, Wilford Youd (hereafter "W. Youd"), and his 
daughters. 
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2. Course of Proceedings 
On or about February 26, 1987, Plaintiff filed a 
Complaint against Defendants alleging that Defendants had 
negligently represented Plaintiff in an action against Zions 
and that as a result, Plaintiff was prevented from pursuing 
his claim against Zions. Pursuant to a Stipulation and 
Order dated September 9, 1987, Plaintiff and Defendants 
stipulated that Defendant, Johnson, was negligent in failing 
to appear at the pre-trial conference and in failing to file 
an appellate brief. An Order entered by the Fourth Judi-
cial District Court limited the issues in the case to 
causation and damages. 
On or about January 27, 1988, Defendants filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment and on or about February 11, 
1988, Plaintiff filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Fourth Judicial District Court heard arguments of 
counsel on their respective Motions for Summary Judgment at 
the pre-trial conference on February 26, 1988. On March 21, 
1988, the Honorable George E. Ballif issued a Ruling denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting De-
fendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. Addendum No. 1. An 
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Order reflecting the Judge's Ruling was entered on April 6, 
1988. Addendum No. 2. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal 
with the Utah Supreme Court on April 20, 1988. On July 7, 
1988, the Utah Supreme Court poured this case over to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
3. Statement of Facts 
a. Facts Surrounding Defendants1 Negligent Prose-
cution of the Zions Action 
In early 1983, Plaintiff employed Defendant, John-
son, who at the time was an attorney practicing with De-
fendant law firm, Howard, Lewis and Peterson, to prosecute a 
civil action against Zions (the wZions Action"). (Record on 
Appea1, Garth Youd v. Richard B. Johnson and Howard, Lewis & 
Peterson, civil no. CV87-457 (hereafter "R."), p. 1, 1T4 and 
p. 12, 1F1.) Defendants filed a Complaint against Zions on 
behalf of Plaintiff in the United States District Court in 
and for the District of Utah, Central Division, on or about 
November 15, 1983, Garth Youd v. Zions First National Bank, 
civil no. C83-1368W. (R. 94-103.) Thereafter, Defendants 
negligently failed to appear at a pre-trial conference in 
the Zions Action. (R. 24.) As a result of Defendants' 
failure to appear, the United States District Court in and 
for the District of Utah, Central Division, entered an Order 
of Dismissal, dismissing the Complaint in the Zions Action 
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with prejudice. (R. 108-109.) Defendants filed a Motion to 
Set Aside Order of Dismissal which was denied by the Honor-
able David K. Winder on December 20, 1985. (R. 2, 12-13.) 
On January 17, 1986, Defendants filed a Notice of 
Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, appealing Judge Winderfs Order, Garth Youd v. Zions 
First National Bank, case no. 86-1143. Thereafter, De-
fendants negligently failed to file an appellant's brief in 
the appeal of the Zions Action. (R. 24.) As a consequence, 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals ordered that the appeal be 
dismissed for lack of prosecution. (R. 111.) 
On or about February 26, 1987, Plaintiff filed this 
action against Defendants alleging their negligent repre-
sentation of Plaintiff in the Zions Action and that, as a 
result of their negligence, Plaintiff was prevented from 
pursuing his claim against Zions. (R. 1-3.) Plaintiff and 
Defendants entered into a Stipulation dated September 9, 
1987, that Defendants were negligent in failing to appear at 
a pre-trial conference and for failing to file and appellate 
brief in the Zions Action appeal. (R. 24-25.) The Fourth 
Judicial District Court entered an Order limiting the issues 
in the case to causation and damages. (R. 26.) 
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b. Facts of the Zions Action 
The Complaint in the Zions Action alleges that 
Zions was liable to Plaintiff for wrongfully paying two 
certificates of deposit to W. Youd. (R. 94-103.) The two 
time certificates of deposit in the Zions Action were issued 
by Zions and are identified as follows: 
1. A six-month time certificate of deposit 
dated March 6, 1980, in the sum of $10,000, number 
31-600964-6, payable to "Wilford Youd or Garth 
Youd;" and 
2. A six-month time certificate of deposit 
dated October 27, 1980, in the sum of $15,000, 
number 31-616341-9, payable to "Wilford Youd or 
Garth Youd." 
(R. 115-118.) Addendum Nos. 3 and 4. Both certificates 
state on their face that 
THIS CERTIFIES THAT there has 
been deposited in this Bank the 
amount of . . . payable to Wilford 
Youd or Garth Youd . . . interest 
at a rate of . . • per annum, 
commencing from . . . and payable 
to depositor, or if more than one, 
to either of any said depositors . 
. . in current funds upon presenta-
tion anc surrender of this certi-
ficate properly endorsed. 
- 6 -
The certificates were kept in a safety deposit box 
at Zions which could be accessed by Plaintiff or his sis-
ters, Leona Warner or LaRaine Mackley. (Deposition of Garth 
Youd, November 7, 1984 (hereafter "G. Youd Depo."), p. 53, 
55.) On February 26, 1982, Plaintiff accessed the above-
described safety deposit box and took into his possession 
both certificates of deposit, ^d. at 69-70. On or about 
September 7, 1982, Plaintiff took the certificates of 
deposit to the Spanish Fork Branch of Zions. The $10,000 
certificate of deposit had matured a day earlier, on Septem-
ber 6, 1982. (R. 177.) The $15,000 certificate of deposit 
was unmatured and would not mature until October 27, 1982. 
(R. 177.) 
Plaintiff instructed Zions1 personnel to recover 
the interest on the $10,000 certificate of deposit which had 
been paid paid to Plaintiff's sister, Leona Warner, and to 
pay that sum to Plaintiff. G. Youd Depo. at 71-72. Plain-
tiff further gave Zions specific instructions renew the 
$10,000 certificate of deposit in his name alone and to 
place the $15,000 certificate of deposit which had not yet 
matured and the reissued $10,000 certificate of deposit in 
Plaintiff's personal safety deposit box. Ld. at 75. After 
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Plaintiff endorsed the $10,000 certificate of deposit, he 
presented it to Zions and Zions took possession of it and 
the $15,000 certificate of deposit. 16. at 74. 
In his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff asserted that Zions 
completed issuing the $10,000 certificate of deposit in 
Plaintiff's name alone. (R. 87.) In support of its as-
sertion, Plaintiff cited depositional testimony of Donna 
Jensen, who was at the time of the subject events a com-
mercial loan secretary with Zions. (R. 87, 136-140.) In her 
deposition, Ms. Jensen testified that she remembers having 
dealt with Plaintiff regarding two certificates of deposit 
on two occasions. (Deposition of Donna Jensen, May 16, 
1984, (hereafter "Jensen Depo.") p. 14-16, 21; Addendum No. 
5.) Her testimony indicates that on both occasions, 
Plaintiff presented a certificate of deposit payable to 
"Wilford Youd or Garth Youd" and requested that they be 
renewed in Plaintiff1 s name only. Id^. at 14. Ms. Jensen 
testified that on both occasions she completed Plaintiff's 
instructions and filled out a certificate of deposit for the 
same amount in Plaintiff's name alone. JE_d. at 14-16, 21, 
30.1 Neither Richard Roach nor Irene Brunson, the two 
1
 The disposition and location of the $10,000 certificate 
- 8 -
other Zions1 employees who were involved in the transaction, 
disputed Ms. Jensen's testimony that the certificate has 
been reissued. Deposition of Richard Roach, May 16, 1984, 
("Roach Depo."), p. 30-45; Deposition of Irene Brunson, May 
16, 1984, ("Brunson Depo."), p. 17-18. 
After Plaintiff presented the $10,000 and $15,000 
certificates of deposit to Zions, Richard Roach, the branch 
manager of the Spanish Fork Branch of Zions, became aware of 
Plaintiff's request regarding the certificates. Roach Depo. 
at 36; Jensen Depo. at 22-26. Though the exact time in not 
certain, Mr. Roach met with Leona Warner, W. Youd's daugh-
ter, who informed Mr. Roach that the "family" was concerned 
about the expenses which W. Youd would incur later in his 
life. Roach Depo. at 38-41. Mr. Roach then requested that 
Ms. Warner have W. Youd contact him. Roach Depo. at 39. 
Apparently responding to Mr. Roach's request, 
Wilford Youd called Mr. Roach at the bank. Roach Depo. at 
42. Mr. Roach informed W. Youd that Plaintiff had made a 
request to remove W. Youd's name from of the $10,000 and 
$.15,000 certificates of deposit, and to put the certificates 
in Plaintiff's name alone. Mr. Roach, however, d^ 'd not know 
of deposit issued in Plaintiff's name alone is unknown. 
Roach Depo. at 32-24. 
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whether the process of reissuing the $10,000 certificate t 
Plaintiff had been completed. Roach Depo. at 36, 37, 
42-43. W. Youd instructed Mr. Roach to take Plaintiff1s 
name off both certificates of deposit and to place the 
certificates in the names of W. Youd's and his two daugh-
ters, Leona Warner and LaRaine Mackley, and to not pay the 
$10,000 certificate of deposit to Plaintiff under any 
circumstances. Roach Depo. at 44. Mr. Roach agreed to car 
out W.Youdfs request. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I, Points 1 and 2 
Summary judgment is proper only where there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and where the moving party 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, a court should view the evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion. 
In this case, there is clearly a genuine issue of 
material fact. The deposition of a Zions1 employee in-
dicates that Zions immediately carried out Plaintiff's 
instructions to reissue the $10,000 certificate of deposit 
as a single party account in the name of Plaintiff alone, 
immediately after receiving the instructions. This testi-
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mony conflicts with Defendants1 assertion that the $10,000 
certificate remained a multiple-party account, payable to 
"Wilford Youd or Garth Youd." 
The resulting question of fact is material for the 
reasons that if the $10,000 certificate of deposit had been 
renewed in Plaintiff's name alone, §75-6-112 does not apply 
to protect Zions from liability, and Zions may be rendered 
liable to Plaintiff for conversion of the certificate of 
deposit. Accordingly, this case should be remanded to the 
trial court for trial on the issue of whether the $10,000 
certificate of deposit had been renewed in Plaintiff's name 
alone as a single-party account. 
ARGUMENT II, Point 1 
If the court accepts the trial court's finding that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Zions 
had not reissued the $10,000 certificate in Plaintiff's name 
alone, §§75-6-108 and 75-6-112, still do not apply to 
protect Zions from liability for three reasons. First, 
Plaintiff was entitled to immediate payment of the $10,000 
certificate of deposit, in the form of a reissued certi-
ficate, pursuant to §70A-3-116 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. That section establishes that an alternate payee on 
an instrument who has possession of the instrument is 
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entitled to payment of the instrument. Plaintiff was 
entitled to immediate payment for the additional reason that 
he complied with the payment requirements clearly stated on 
the face of the certificate. 
Because Zions refused to accept Plaintiff's due 
presentment, Plaintiff acquired an immediate right of 
recourse under §70A-5-307, as well as a cause of action for 
breach of contract. Section 75-6-112 has absolutely no 
application to the question of whether a financial insti-
tution must pay a duly presented and matured certificate of 
deposit. That section applies to protect the financial 
institutions from liability only after payment has been made 
on a duly presented multiple-party instrument. 
ARGUMENT 11/ Point 2 
The second reason why Plaintiff is entitled to 
recover against Zions as a matter of law is that, W. Youd 
failed to make a "proper request" as required by §§75-6-108 
and 75-6-101. Sections 75-6-108 and 75-6-101 require that 
in order for a financial institution to be relieved of li-
ability for payment of a multiple-party account, it must 
have received a "proper request" for payment. "Proper 
request" is defined as a request which complies with the 
conditions of the account, which in this case are 1) pre-
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sentment, 2) endorsement, and 3) surrender of the certi-
ficate. W. Youd did not present the certificate, endorse 
the certificate or surrender the certificate, but merely 
made an oral request over the telephone to change the payee 
on the certificate of deposit. Because W. Youd failed to 
make a proper request, Zions should not have complied with 
his instructions and should have paid the certificates of 
deposit pursuant to Plaintiff's instructions. Accordingly, 
Zions should not have prevailed as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT II, Point 3 
Finally, Zions is subject to liability for Zions1 
conversion and negligent handling of the $10,000 and $15,000 
certificates of deposit. Plaintiff's entrusting of the 
certificates of deposit to Zions gave rise to a bailee-
bailor relationship which obligated Zions to exercise due 
care in complying with Plaintiff's instructions. In com-
plete disregard of Plaintiff's instructions to renew the 
$10,000 certificate and place both certificates of deposit 
in Plaintiff's safety deposit box, Zions acted to extinguish 
Plaintiff's ownership interest in both certificates and 
replace the certificates with certificates in the names of 
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W. Youd and his daughters. For this additional reason, the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous as a 
matter of law. 
ARGUMENT I 
BECAUSE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERI-
AL FACT EXISTED/ THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states 
summary judgment shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. 
(Emphasis added.) The summary judgment procedure is in-
tended to avoid the time and expense of litigation where the 
facts are undisputed and there is no issue of law. Rich v. 
McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1267-1268 (Utah 1976); Western 
Pacific Transport Co. v. Beehive State Agricultural Co-Op., 
497 P.2d 854, 855 (Utah 1979). However, summary judgment is 
a drastic remedy and should be granted with extreme care. 
Housley v. Annaconda Co., 527 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1967). 
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In determining whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists, the trial court must evaluate the pleadings, 
affidavits and depositions on file in the case in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 
Frisbey v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 
1984). If there is any doubt or uncertainty whether a 
question of fact exists, the doubt must be resolved in favor 
of the party opposing the motion. _I_d. If a court grants 
summary judgment where there is a doubt as to whether a 
question of fact exists, the opposing party is unjustly 
denied the opportunity to conduct discovery and present 
additional evidence to resolve the question. Furthermore, 
unjustified granting of summary judgment fails the goal of 
avoiding unnecessary litigation and instead results in even 
greater expenditures. Western Pacific Transport Co., 597 
P.2d at 855. 
In ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, the trial court concluded that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed between the parties. (R. 195.) 
However, the court contradicted its conclusion on page three 
of the ruling by acknowledging that Plaintiff did dispute 
one of Defendants1 factual assertions. (R. 196.) 
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Defendants1 arguments, as outlined in their Memo-
randum Supporting Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, 
are premised on the fact Zions had not reissued the $10,000 
certificate of deposit in Plaintiff's name alone at the 
time W. Youd requested that the certificate be put in his 
and his daughters1 names.2 (R. 43-47, 179-183). Contro-
verting Defendants1 representation of the facts, Plaintiff 
asserted in his Motion in Opposition to Summary Judgment 
that the reissuance of the $10,0000 certificate of deposit 
had been completed before W. Youd instructed Zions to not 
make payment to Plaintiff. (R. 87.) In support of this 
assertion^ Plaintiff cited depositional testimony of the 
Zions employee most involved in the transaction indicating 
that the $10,000 certificate of deposit was reissued in the 
name of Plaintiff alone before W. Youd contacted the bank. 
(R. 87.) 
Defendants even entitled one of their arguments, "The 
Certificates of Deposit Were 'Joint Accounts' Under Utah 
Law," clearly implying that the certificates of deposit 
were never reissued as a single party account. (R. 43.) 
Additionally, Defendants' statement of fact in its 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment assumes that 
the $10,000 certificate of deposit was not reissued in 
Plaintiff's name alone, prior to W. Youd's instructions 
to do otherwise. (R. 39-40.) Finally, Defendants 
argued in their Memorandum Opposing Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment that Zions followed W. Youd's 
instructions and, impliedly, not those of Plaintiff. 
(R. 179.) 
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Donna Jensen, in her deposition of May 16, 1984, 
testified that one of her normal duties as commercial loan 
secretary with Zions was the issuance and reissuance of 
certificates of deposit. Jensen Depo. at 6. She further 
testified that she dealt with Plaintiff on two occasions 
regarding certificates of deposit payable to "Wilford Youd 
or Garth Youd." j^ d. at 20. On each occasion, Plaintiff 
presented Ms. Jensen with a certificate of deposit payable 
to "Wilford Youd or Garth Youd" and instructed her to 
reissue it in Plaintiff's name alone. Jjd. at 12. 
The following testimony of Donna Jensen indicates 
that she complied with Plaintiff's instructions and com-
pleted the physical process of reissuing a new certificate 
of deposit in Plaintiff1s name alone: 
QUESTION: And his [Garth Youd's] 
simple instruction to you was 
simply to do what with the time 
certificate? 
JENSEN: He wanted to renew it and 
just have it put in his name. 
QUESTION: What did you say? 
JENSEN: I did it. 
QUESTION: And did you take a time 
certificate he had furnished you 
and fill out another time certi-
ficate that would be in the same 
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amount with interest in his name 
only? 
JENSEN: Yes. 
Jensen Depo. at 14. Plaintiff cited this testimony, to-
gether with testimony on page 21 of Ms. Jensen's depo-
sition, in his Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
(R. 87.) Additional testimony by Ms. Jensen, not cited by 
Plaintiff, further supports the fact that the certificate of 
deposit had been reissued. Jensen Depo. at 30. 
The trial court apparently disregarded this evi-
dence clearly supporting Plaintiff's view of the facts, 
despite Defendants' failure to cite any evidence whatsoever 
supporting their position. Richard Roach, the Branch 
Manager of the Spanish Fork Branch of Zions, testified that 
he simply did not know whether Ms. Jensen had completed 
reissuing the $10,000 certificate in Plaintiff's name alone. 
Roach Depo. at 36, 37. Additionally, Irene Brunson, the 
other Zions employee involved in the transaction, testified 
that she had no recollection of Plaintiff's instructions to 
renew the $10,000 certificate of deposit and to place both 
certificates in Plaintiff's safety deposit box. Brunson 
Depo. at 10-14, 16-18. 
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The only evidence which might be argued to support 
Defendants' position that the certificate of deposit was not 
reissued is the physical absence of the reissued certi-
ficate. According to the testimony of Plaintiff, both 
certificates were left with the bank in order that they be 
placed in his safety deposit box. G. Youd Depo. at 77-78. 
However, the bank has been unable to locate the reissued 
certificate of deposit or a copy of the reissued certificate 
of deposit. Roach Depo. at 34. If the certificate exists, 
it must be assumed that the bank misplaced it or destroyed 
it upon W. Youd's instructions to reissue the certificate 
without Plaintiff's name. In any event, this evidence (or 
rather absence of evidence) was not raised by Defendants. 
When the testimony of Donna Jensen is viewed in a 
light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is apparent that a 
factual dispute existed involving the reissuance of the 
$10,000 certificate of deposit. In view of this question of 
fact, the trial court erred in granting Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The materiality of the disputed fact 
is outlined below in Points 1 and 2. It should be noted 
that this factual issue involves only the $10,000 certi-
ficate of deposit and not the $15,000 certificate, which had 
not yet matured. 
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POINT 1; Whether the reissuance of the 
$10/000 certificate of deposit had 
been completed is a material fact 
for the reason that/ if completed/ 
§§75-6-108 and 75-6-112 do""n"5T 
protect the bank from liability. 
The question of whether the transaction had been 
completed before W. Youd contacted Zions is very clearly a 
material issue of fact. It is material for the reason that 
a finding by the court that the $10,000 certificate of 
deposit was reissued would preclude Zions from the pro-
tection afforded by §§75-6-108 and 75-6-112, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Annotated §75-6-108 states in relevant 
part that n[a]ny multiple party account may be paid/ on 
request/ to any one or more of the parties." (Emphasis 
added.) Section 75-6-112 "discharges a financial insti-
tution from all claims or amounts . . . [paid under §75-
6-108]." These statutes operate to protect the bank from 
liability to one party on a multiple party account for 
payment duly made to another party to the account. 
In the instant case, there is a question as to 
whether the $10,000 certificate was a single or multiple 
party account at the time W. Youd contacted the bank. If the 
$10,000 certificate of deposit was reissued in Plaintiff's 
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name alone, the account lost its status as a multiple party 
account and became a single party account. Plaintiff 
therefore became the sole owner of the certificate and as 
such was the only person entitled to enforce, receive 
payment of, and otherwise deal with the certificate. W. 
Youd had absolutely no interest in or control over the 
account. Accordingly, §§75-6-108 and 75-6-112 no longer 
applied to protect the bank for payment of the account 
according to W. Youd's instructions. Neither W. Youd nor 
Zions had a right, statutory or otherwise, to change the 
payee on the account. Sections 75-6-108 and 75-6-112 do 
not apply to protect the bank from interfering with the 
ownership rights of a single party account holder at the 
request of a former party to the account. 
The trial court erred in not properly examining the 
facts surrounding the reissuance of the $10,000 certificate 
of deposit. A finding that the certificate was reissued 
results in the inapplicability of Utah Code Ann. §§75-6-108 
and 75-6-112. Without the protection of these statutes, it 
must be concluded that Zions caused Plaintiff's loss of the 
value of the $10,000 certificate of deposit. 
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An action for conversion is generally based on 1) 
ownership of the property, 2) a right to possession of the 
property, and 3) the alleged wrongdoer's unauthorized do-
minion over the property resulting in damages to the pro-
perty owner. Farmer State Bank of Victor v. Imperial Cattle 
Co., 708 P.2d 223, 227 (Mont. 1985); see H.L. Allred v. 
Hinkley, 8 Utah.2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958). As a 
named payee on the $10,000 certificate of deposit, Plaintiff 
was an owner of the certificate. As an owner of the certi-
ficate, Plaintiff had a right to possession and did in fact 
have possession of the $10,000 certificate. Finally, 
Zions1s removal of Plaintiff's name from the certificate and 
replacement of his name with the names of W. Youd's daugh-
ters, constitutes Zions' exercise of unauthorized inter-
ference with Plaintiff's rights to the certificate. 
The facts indicate that W. Youd contacted Richard 
Roach, the Branch Manager of the Spanish Fork Branch of 
Zions, and instructed Mr. Roach to remove Plaintiff's name 
from the $10,000 and $15,000 certificates of deposit and to 
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replace it with the names of his two daughters. He speci-
fically instructed Mr. Roach to not allow Plaintiff payment 
of the $10,000 certificate under any circumstances. 
However, if Zions completed the renewal of the 
$10,000 certificate of deposit in Plaintiff's name alone, 
Plaintiff was the sole owner of the certificate and as such 
was the only person entitled to enforce, receive payment of, 
and to otherwise deal with the certificate. As a single-
party account, W. Youd no longer had any kind of ownership 
interest in the certificate. Consequently, at the time W. 
Youd contacted Zions, he had no right to change the payee on 
the account or to otherwise deal with the account. Never-
theless, Zions complied with W. Youd's instructions and 
filled out a new $10,000 certificate of deposit, replacing 
Plaintiff's name with the names of W. Youd, LaRaine Mackley, 
and Leona Warner. The effect of Zions1 actions was to not 
only interfere with Plaintiff's ownership of the certifi-
cate, but to extinguish all of Plaintiff's ownership right 
in the certificate. Zions should therefore be liable for 
conversion of $10,000, the face amount of the certificate. 
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ARGUMENT II 
ACCEPTING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING OF FACT THAT THE TRANS-
ACTION HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED, DE-
FENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
In order to grant a party's motion for summary 
judgment, a trial court must find that the party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In this case, Defendants were not entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law on three alternative grounds. 
These grounds are set forth below as Points 1, 2 and 3. 
POINT 1: Because 
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Section 70A-3-116, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amend-
ed) , of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code states that 
An instrument payable to the order 
of two or more persons 
a) if in the alternative is 
payable to one of them and may 
be negotiated as charged or 
enforced by any of them who 
has possession of it; . . . 
See Smith, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co. of Western New York, 80 
A.D.2d 496, 439 N.Y.2d 543 (1981). 
- 24 -
The $10,000 and $15,000 certificates of deposit 
involved in this case were payable to "Wilford Youd or Garth 
Youd." According to §70A-3-116, whoever had possession of 
either certificate of deposit was entitled, by mere pos-
session of the certificate, to immediate payment upon 
presentment. There is no dispute that Plaintiff had pos-
session of the matured $10,000 certificate of deposit. 
Additionally, Defendants admit that Plaintiff took the 
$10,000 certificate of deposit to Zions and requested that 
the certificate be "rolled over" in Plaintiff's name alone. 
(R. 39.) It should be noted that Plaintiff1s request that 
the certificate be "rolled over" is no less a request for 
payment than a request for cash. In renewing the $10,000 
certificate, the funds from the matured certificate would 
have been used to fund the new certificate. By reissuing 
the $10,000 certificate, Zions would have effectively made 
payment to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's actions therefore 
constituted due presentment of the certificate which gave 
rise to an obligation on Zions1 part to accept and make 
payment of the certificate. 
Section 70A-3-507 provides that an instrument is 
dishonored when presentment is duly made and due acceptance 
or payment is refused. §70A-3-507(1)(a). Accordingly, 
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Zions1 failure to renew the $10,000 certificate of deposit 
according to Plaintiff's instructions constituted a dishonor 
of the certificate. Section 70A-3-507 also provides that 
when an instrument is duly presented and dishonored, the 
holder requires an immediate right of recourse against the 
bank. Based on §§70A-3-316 and 70A-3-507, Zions is liable 
to Plaintiff for refusing to pay the $10,000 certificate of 
deposit as requested by Plaintiff. 
Zions is further liable to Plaintiff for failing to 
pay the $10,000 certificate on the basis that Zions violated 
the contractual terms stated on the face of the certificate 
of deposit. Those terms require that payment be made when 
the certificate is 1) properly endorsed, 2) duly presented, 
and 3) surrendered to the bank. In this case, Plaintiff 
complied with all three requirements and was therefore 
contractually entitled to payment. 
The trial court apparently failed to recognize 
Plaintiff's statutory and contractual rights to payment 
acquired by virtue of Plaintiff's possession of the $10,000 
certificate of deposit. Apparently assuming that §70A-3-116 
does not apply, the court concluded that §75-6-112 controls 
the question of whether Plaintiff was entitled to payment. 
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Contrary to the unstated assumption of the court, Plain-
tiffs statutory and contractual rights to payment are not 
abrogated by §75-6-112 under the facts of this case. 
Defendants rely on §75-6-112 to claim that Zions 
is not liable to Plaintiff for failing to renew the $10,000 
certificate in Plaintiff's name. As previously stated, 
§75-6-112 "discharges the financial institution from all 
claims for amounts [paid under §75-6-108 to one party of a 
multiple-party account]." This statute does not, however, 
extend to relieve Zions of liability for failing to pay a 
duly presented instrument. Section 75-6-112 does not endow 
a financial institution with the discretion to determine 
whether or not to pay a duly presented certificate of 
deposit. In fact, the Uniform Probate Code sections have 
absolutely no application to the question of payment of a 
duly presented instrument. Section 70A-3-116 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code clearly requires that a financial institu-
tion must make payment of a duly presented certificate of 
deposit by an alternate payee who has possession of the 
certificate. Where two requests have been made, Zions must 
comply with the first duly made request for payment, but is 
protected by §75-6-112 from liability for doing so. 
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To construe §75-6-112 to mean that financial 
institutions cannot be held liable for refusing to pay a 
duly presented instrument would strip §70A-3-116 of meaning 
and negate the remedy afforded under §70A-3-507. Addition-
ally/ §§75-6-108 and 75-6-112 were designed to relieve banks 
from the burden of determining the ownership interests of 
the various parties in multiple-party accounts prior to 
making payment on the account. If §75-6-112 were construed 
to give financial institutions the discretion to determine 
whether to pay duly presented instruments, those institu-
tions would be encouraged to investigate the ownership 
interests of the various parties to assist them in deter-
mining whether to make payment on a multiple-party account. 
This result would directly contradict the stated purpose of 
the statutes protecting financial institutions for payment 
made on multiple-party accounts. 
In the instant case, the $10,000 certificate of 
deposit held matured, was endorsed by Plaintiff who was a 
named payee, and was duly presented and surrendered to the 
bank. Rather than pay the certificate of deposit as re-
quired by §§70A-3-116 and 70A-3-507 and the terms of the 
certificate of deposit, Zions dishonored the instrument and 
chose to await the instructions of the other party to the 
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account. The trial court erred in failing to apply §70A-
3-116 and in improperly applying 75-6-112 to protect Zions 
from its refusal to pay the duly presented certificate of 
deposit. 
POINT 2; Wilford Youdfs request that the 
two certificates of deposit be re-
issued in his name and the names 
of his two daughters was not a 
"proper request" as required by 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-6-108 and 
75-6-101(12) 
Looking again at §75-6-108, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended): 
Any multiple-party account may be 
paid, on request, to any one or 
more of the parties . . . 
(Emphasis added.) Defining the term "request," §75-6-
101(12) provides that: 
"Request" means a proper request 
for withdrawal, or a check or 
order for payment, which complies 
with all conditions of the ac-
count, including special require-
ments concerning necessary signa-
tures and regulations of financial 
institutions. . . 
(Emphasis added.) In view of §75-6-101, §75-6-112 does not 
provide protection to a financial institution which complies 
with a request for withdrawal of funds that is in violation 
of the terms of the account. 
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The terms of the two certificates of deposit at 
issue are listed on the face of each certificate. These 
terms require that/ in order that payment be made, the 
certificates be 1) presented to Zions; 2) surrendered to 
Zions; and 3) properly endorsed. W. Youd's "request" 
consisted of a telephone conversation with Richard Roach 
orally requesting that Mr. Roach remove Plaintiff's name 
from the certificates and replace Plaintiff's name with the 
names of Leona Warner and LaRaine Mackley. Roach Depo. at 
44. W. Youd neither presented nor surrendered the certi-
ficates of deposit to Zions, nor did he endorse either of 
the certificates. Zions followed W. Youd's telephone 
instructions despite the fact that W. Youd failed to meet 
the payment requirements clearly set forth on the face of 
the certificates of deposit. Zions* conduct violated the 
contractual language which Zions drafted and set forth on 
its own pre-printed certificates of deposit. 
Because W. Youd's request was not a "proper re-
quest" as required by §75-6-101, Zions is not entitled to 
the protection of §75-6-112. To allow Zions protection 
under §75-6-112 against liability from payment pursuant to 
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an improper request would relieve financial institutions 
from any responsibility of complying with the terms of the 
multiple-party accounts in distributing funds under those 
accounts. 
POINT 3: Even if the $10,000 certificate of 
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A bailee/bailor relationship exists when there is a 
delivery of the bailor's property and an acceptance by the 
bailee of that property. Webb v. Aero International, Inc., 
633 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Ariz. App. 1981). Plaintiff testified 
that he left the $10,000 certificate of deposit with Zions 
to be reissued and placed, together with the $15,000 certi-
ficate in his safety deposit box. G. Youd Depo. at 73-74. 
Zions accepted the $10,000 certificate of deposit agreeing 
to renew the certificate and to place both certificates in 
Plaintiff's safety deposit box. G. Youd Depo. at 74. 
The resulting bailee-bailor relationship which 
existed between Zions and Plaintiff required that Zions 
exercise ordinary care in safeguarding the certificates of 
deposit according to Plaintiff's instructions. M. Bruenger 
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& Co./ Inc. v. Dodge City Truck Stop, 675 P.2d 864, 868 
(Kan. 1984). Ordinary care is defined as the care which a 
person in similar circumstances would customarily use 
towards similar bailed property. McGinness v. Grossman/ 391 
P.2d 967, 969 (Wash. 1964). Zions failed to exercise 
ordinary care by neglecting to reissue the $10,000 certi-
ficate of deposit. Zions was also negligent by failing to 
place the reissued $10,000 and the $15,000 certificates of 
deposit in Plaintiff's safety deposit box. Zions1 disregard 
for the terms of the bailment in caring for the $10,000 and 
the $15,000 certificates of deposit, as entrusted to it by 
Plaintiff., constitutes negligence. 
Where a bailee's acts clearly indicate a repudia-
tion of the bailor's ownership rights to the property, the 
bailee is liable for conversion of the bailed property. 
Torix v. Allred, 606 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Idaho 1984). Further-
more, conversion may be established where it is demonstrated 
that the bailee's conduct is in derogation of the bailor's 
possessory rights. Merchant's Leasing Co. v. Clark, 540 
P.2d 922, 925 (Wash. App. 1975). 
In this case, Plaintiff was a named payee on both 
certificates of deposit and as such had ownership rights to 
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the certificates of deposit. Furthermore/ because Plaintiff 
had possession of both the $10,000 and the $15,000 certi-
ficates of deposit, it was he, and not W. Youd, who had the 
right to enforce, receive payment of, and to otherwise deal 
with the certificates. Zions failed to place the certi-
ficates of deposit presented to Zions by Plaintiff in 
Plaintifffs safety deposit box. Instead, Zions deliberately 
filled out new certificates of deposit, leaving off Plain-
tiff's name and replacing it with the names of Leona Warner 
and LaRaine Mackley. Zions1 deliberate failure to comply 
with Plaintiff's instructions clearly constitutes a repudia-
tion of Plaintiff's rights to the certificates of deposit 
acquired by virtue of Plaintiff's possession of the certi-
ficates of deposit. Accordingly, Zions is liable to Plain-
tiff for conversion of both the $10,000 and the $15,000 
certificates of deposit. 
Zions is liable for conversion for the additional 
reason that in issuing the $10,000 certificate of deposit 
according to W. Youd's instructions, Zions failed to obtain 
W. Youd's endorsement. Section 70A-3-419, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended), states that "(1) an instrument is con-
verted when . . . (c) it is paid on a forged endorsement." 
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It is well settled that payment on a missing endorsement is 
equivalent to payment on a forged endorsement, which es-
tablishes conversion. Humberto Decorators/ Inc. v. Plaza 
National Bank, 434 A.2d 618, 621 (N.J. 1981); Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Marine National Bank, 431 F.2d 
341, 344 (5th Cir. 1970); Berkheimer's, Inc. v. Citizens 
Valley Bank, 529 P.2d 903, 905 (Or. 1974). 
The $10,000 certificate of deposit had already been 
endorsed by Plaintiff for the purpose of renewing the 
$10,000 certificate in Plaintiff's name alone. Plaintiff's 
possession and endorsement of the $10,000 certificate 
entitled him to payment of the certificate. Instead, Zions 
made payment to W. Youd by filling out a new $10,000 certi-
ficate in the names of W. Youd and his daughters without 
obtaining the endorsement of W. Youd. Zions had no right to 
make payment to W. Youd without W. Youd's possession, 
presentment, and endorsement of the certificate. Zions 
payment to W. Youd without his endorsement constitutes 
Zions1 conversion of Plaintiff's ownership interest in the 
certificate. Zions is therefore liable to Plaintiff for the 
face amount of the instrument. §70A-3-419(2). 
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CONCLUSION 
The facts of the instant case, when viewed in a 
light most favorable to Plaintiff, present a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether Zions completed the process 
of reissuing the $10,000 certificate of deposit in Plain-
tiff's name alone. In view of this question of fact, the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous and 
the case should be remanded to the lower court for a trial 
on the disputed fact. 
In addition to the factual issue, Defendants were 
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff had 
possession of, duly presented, endorsed and surrendered the 
$10,000 certificate of deposit. According to the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the terms stated on the face of the 
certificate, he was therefore entitled to immediate payment. 
Zions' wrongful refusal to make payment to Plaintiff con-
stituted a dishonor of the instrument and created a right of 
recourse in Plaintiff. 
Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law for the further reason that W. Youd's request 
to prevent payment to Plaintiff was not a "proper request." 
Finally, as a bailee of the certificates, Zions reissuance 
of the certificates in W. Youd's and his daughters' names 
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constituted conversion of both of the certificates. Because 
Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this court reverse the 
lower court's judgment and grant judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff. 
DATED this day of August, 1988. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
GARTH YOUD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, a 
partnership, 
Defendants. 
Case Number CV 87 457 
RULING 
******** 
In this matter cross motions for summary judgment have 
been made and submitted to the court in accordance with Rule 2.8, 
and the court having considered the memorandum of law, and 
arguments presented at the pretrial held on February 26, 1988, 
and having fully considered the matter now enters its: 
RULING 
The court denies the plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment. 
The court grants defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. 
The stipulation of the parties leaves the only issue in 
the case to be whether, althouah t-he defendant Johnson was guilty 
of negligence in not attending to matters in a timely way, was 
this negligence a proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss of the 
Federal District Court lawsuit? To put it another way, would the 
Federal Court lawsuit have succeeded, or was likely to suceed had 
counsel b€>en diligent in pursuing the case to a decision on its 
merits? 
There is no material issue of fact between the partiesc 
The only fact issues relates to whether or not, accepting the 
plaintiff's view of the facts, his dictation of a note to the 
tellers at Zions Bank that interest on the $10,000.00 CD be 
recovered and added to that certificate and rolled over into a 
new certificate and issued in the name of plaintiff and placed in 
his safety deposit box, was sufficient to give plaintiff the 
benefit of the notice required by 75-6-112 Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as amended in that such a note if complying with that 
statutes required notice would invalidate any subsequent action 
taken by the bank in honoring the oral request of the other co-
tenant, Wilford Youd, plaintiff's father, that Garth's name be 
removed from the certificate and two other family members along 
with Wilfords be placed thereon. 
The bank received an oral request from the co-tenant, 
Wilford Youd, who it recognized as the purchaser of the CD and 
whose direction they elected to take in the: handling of the 
$10,000.00 certificate which had matured. The provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated, 75-6-108 relieves the bank from liability in 
making a decision as to how to pay a multi-party account. The 
making a decision as to how to pay a multi-party account. The 
only circumstance where the bank would not escape liability by 
making a Section 108 decision is where the bank M. . . has 
received written notice from any party able to request payment to 
the effect that withdrawals in accordance with the terms of the 
account should not be permitted." The notice given by the 
plaintiff and written down by the bank employees, does not convey 
the message required of the above cited statute which is in 
effect a statement that there is a problem or conflict as to the 
interests of the parties in the CD and until resolved or such 
notice withdrawn the CD is to remain as is. The message given 
the bank by plaintiff was convert this account to his exclusive 
dominion and control which the bank chose not to honor and 
elected to honor the direction of the other co-tenant. 
The bank is therefore exonerated on both notes since 
the message went to both, but there is another reason the 
$15,000.00 CD was not affected by any notice of either party in 
that the $15,000.00 CD had not matured and it could not be paid 
to either tenant until maturity. 
As to the other contention of the plaintiff that before 
receiving any instruction from Wilford Youd that the bank 
employees had made the changes requested by plaintiff on the 
$10,000.00 CD. This is contrary to the facts established by 
those who would have made the change to who said that it was not 
done before the bank manager was consulted and Wilford Youd 
contacted them with other requests which were followed. 
Therefore, it is clear that the Federal litigation 
would have been adverse to plaintiff. 
Counsel for the defendant is directed to prepare and 
appropriate order granting summary judgment if within ten (10) 
days from the date hereof plaintiff has not filed written 
requests for further proceedings. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this *2/ <3ay of March, 1988. 
GEORGES. BALL IF, ^ ODGE 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER (A2371), 
THOMAS L. KAY (A1778) and 
PAUL D. NEWMAN (A4889) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
„cw 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
GARTH YOUD, 
V. 
Plaintiff, 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON and 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON, 
a partnership, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CV-87-457 
Judge Ballif 
ooOoo 
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment and defendants' motion for summary judgment 
submitted pursuant to Rule 2.8. Arguments of counsel were heard 
at the pretrial conference on February 26, 1988. After reviewing 
the memoranda filed by the parties, hearing the arguments of 
counsel, and good cause appearing, and pursuant to the Court's 
Ruling dated March 21, 1988, 
JINNEY 
EKER 
-ct Bldg 
CE C I T Y , 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for 
summary judgment is granted. 
^ . 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
icigment is granted. 
DATED this & day of ^ ^ t 4 _ ^ _ , 
George E<^>Ballif i/ 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the K^j/h day of March, 1988, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS" MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Roy G, Haslam 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
'^-CLsunOt. r^^ZsUL, JUL 
[NNEY 
,KER 
t Bldg 
: CITY, 
: 0 0 1 
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ADDENDUM NO. 3 
; ^ 
FORM O0-O243 
•G, i: NUMBER 
i- -
TYPE_ 
*IS CERTIFIES THAT there has been 
•posited in this Bank the amount of 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
Branch Spanish Fork 
N0N-NEG0UA81E 
^ _ 
Issued mt Utah.. 
W\ KW 
;^,:P*1 
'MOQ&aBrtm 5Ite (10,000.00 
(J 
ya bfe to , 
Sdress 
Wilfbrd Youd or Garth Yoad 
360 Ea$t 400 Korth 
Social Security 
erest at the rate o i ^ « 7 > * % per annum commencing from H a f C a U 
___ or Identification Number 
ritv Spanish Fork, li stJte I f t i E 
529-24-5S62 
, Zip Code B400U 
19 80 and payable „ Sept. 6 . i$0 
depositor, or If more than one, to either or any of said depositors or the survivor or survivors in current funds upon presentation and surrender of this certify 
e property endorsed. Interest payable: Q quarterly Immaturity. 
s certificate shell be Automatically tr*ni*md for successive like maturity periods if the certificate is not presented »nd surrendered for payment within ten (10) 
•s after the original or any renewed maturity date, or unless the Sank issues or mails notice to the contrary to depositors) or to either or any of said de-
itors at least ten (10) business days before any such maturity date, and any mailed notice shall be sent to the address above or then designated on Bank's 
wds. The Interest rate for each renewal period shall be the prevailing rate of the Sank on new Time Certificates of like duration on renewal date. Certificate 
isferable only upon books of the Bank. Subject jo applicable present and future state and federal laws and regulations. 
ificate not redeemable prior to original or final renewed maturity, and deposit bears no interest after original or final renewed maturity 
rest to be paid b r D Compound Q Oeposit Checking Account I I 1 -1 1 I I 1 f H 1 B R A N C H C O P Y F ILE A L P H A B E T I C A L L Y 
Q f Remit by Mat! Q Oeposit Savings Account 
i " ! 1 1 I 1 1 
J i I I I I L B y . 
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ZIONS PJLJKST NATIONAL BANK :^fc|3&il|-[fT 
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CERTIFIES THAT there has b**n 
ted «n this Sank the amount of „___ 
elfcilford loud or Carth Toud 
Office City 
Social S 
. U t a h . _ Oc t .27 . 1980 
Oate 
* I? cs 15,000,00 
or Identification Number 
529 2* 3562 ,,360 £*»t 400 Mortfa 
t at th* rate of * J L l _ _ . '• P*r *«««*" commencing from U C t * *^ P 
c.ty Spanigh Fork 
19 ° 0 . and payable 
statel?tah 2<p code34660 
A p r i l 24, .
 1 981 
isitor, or if more than one. to either or any of said depositors or the "survivor or survivors in current funds upon presentation and surrender of this ccrtifi 
operfy endorsed Interest payable* Q quarterly Q maturity 
rtificate shall be automatically renewed for successive like maturity periods if the certificate is not presented and surrendered for payment within ten (10) 
ter the original or any renewed maturity date, or unless the Bank issues or mails notice to the contrary to depositoris) or to either or any of said de 
» at least ten (10) business days before any such maturity date, and any mailed notice shall be sent to the address above or then designated on Bank's 
The interest rate for each renewal period shall be the prevailing rate of the Bank on new Time Certificates of like duration on renewal date Certificate 
able only upon books of the Bank Subject to applicable present and future state and federal laws and regulations 
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ADDENDUM NO. 5 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * 
GARTH YOUDr 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Defendant. 
* * * 
Civil No. C83-1368W 
Deposition of: 
DONA JENSEN 
Deposition of DONA JENSEN, taken at the instance 
and request of the Plaintiff, at the law offices of Howard, 
Lewis & Petersen, 120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah, on the 16th 
day of May, 1984, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., before LANETTE 
SHINDURLING, a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Utah License No. 
122, and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah. 
* * * 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 322-3441 
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Q Do you understand that there's a difference between 
the adjunctive "and" and the conjunctive "or"? 
h Yes, I do. 
Q Did you determine that the time certificate had, in 
fact, and/or on it? 
A Yes. 
Q And his simple instruction to you was simply to do 
what with that time certificate? 
A He wanted to renew it and just have it put in his 
name. 
Q What did you say? 
A I did it. 
Q And did you take a time certificate that he had 
furnished you and fill out another time certificate that would 
be in the same amount with interest in his name only? 
A Yes. 
MR. PRATT: Off the record, if I can go off the 
record. I think we may have a confusion as to dates here. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Let me handle it and we'll see 
where we go. 
How long did that process take, just five or ten 
minutes? 
A Ten minutes at the moot. 
Q And Mr. Youd then received the time certificate for 
the initial amount plus interest? 
1 
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Yes. 
And walked out the door? 
Yes. 
You personally delivered that to him? 
Yes. 
And that was the end of your dealings with him? 
Yes. 
Now, do you remember another occasion? 
I think he brought in another certificate. 
At another time? 
A A couple of days or three days — well, some days 
later. 
Q But in September of '82? 
A I'm not sure. 
Q And what happened on that occasion, did he again 
come to you? 
A Yes. 
Q Because he dealt with you now once before? 
A Yes. 
Q And what certificate did he give to you at this time? 
A I'm not sure. It was just a — I do not remember 
the dollar amount. 
Q Was it another certificate again in the name of 
Wilford Youd or Garth Youd? 
A Yes, it was. 
16 
Q What was his instruction to you on that occasion? 
A The same as before. 
Q Do you know where he had come from? 
A No. 
Q Did you follow his instructions? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you give hira back another time certificate 
of deposit in his name only with the face amount of the 
initial deposit together with interest? 
A Yes. 
Q And he walked out the door? 
A Yes. 
Q Did anything else happen? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q No other conversations? 
A No. 
Q Did you meet with Mr. Youd again? 
A I'm not sure. I can't remember. 
Q If you did, you donft remember it? 
A I don't remember. 
Q And if you met with Mr. Youd before these two 
occasions that you've just described for me, you can't 
remember them? 
A Not definitely. 
Q You just have a memory that you may have seen him 
21 
Q Would you tell me what Irene's job was vis-a-vis 
your job as of September of 1982? 
A Shefs installment loan secretary and would deal with 
new accounts if the need arose. 
Q Now, you1re confident that the two times that you 
met with Mr. Youd you were able to complete his instructions, 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q There was no holding onto the time certificates, you 
did what he said while he was there? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, did you ever have a telephone conversation with 
Mr. Youd? 
A' Not that I remember. 
Q Could you have had a conversation and don't recall 
it? 
A Possibly, yes. 
Q Now, did you ever deal with Leana Warner concerning 
her time certificates? 
A I could have. 
Q Do you have any memory of that? 
A Not definitely, no. 
Q Taking you back to about the same time period, 
September of 1982 and when you dealt with Mr. Youd, do you 
remember within a time period close thereto seeing Leona 
30 
where the bank has money on deposit in any form and various 
people are making a claim to that money? 
A Not directly. 
Q Well, do you know of a bank policy that if more than 
one person are claiming the same moneys that the bank refuses 
to give it to anyone and pays it into Court or waits to be 
ordered by the Court to pay it to a certain person? 
A No, I personally don't know that. 
MR. JOHNSON: That's all I have. Give us one 
second. 
(Short recess.) 
MR. JOHNSON: No more questions. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PRATT: 
Q I just have a couple of questions. Mr. Johnson 
asked you about two separate occasions on which Mr. Garth Youd 
came to you and presented to you certificates that were 
payable to either he or Wilford Youd and I think you testified 
earlier that you had complied with his instructions, is that 
right? 
A Yes. 
Q You issued him on both those occasions certificates 
of deposit in the same amount that were flyable just to Garth 
Youd? 
A Yes. 
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